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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

ARTHUR P. DANSAK, and
ROBERTS. LYON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9355

LOUIS C. DELUKE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The controlling factual question in this case is:
What consideration did plaintiffs Dansak and Lyon give
for Lucy Deluke Jones' (now Lucy Deluke) promise and
consumated agreement to assign to the Sphinx Head
Mining Corporation its only asset, the lease she owned
to the Carisa mining property in Utah, and in return
for which they were to share in the stock of the corporation? The defendant contends that the discharge of the
claims which are the subject of the present suit was the
consideration. The defendant contends that the consumated agreement of March 6, 1957, discharged the
1
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claims, and that in any event the actual transfer to the
corporation of the lease and the action of the Board of
Directors in formally determining a stock distribution
did so.
Before detailing the significant facts, it should be
noted that Lucy Deluke Jones (known herein as Lucy
Deluke) is the niece of Louis C. Deluke, the defendant
in this action. At the time of the transactions here concerned she was the wife of Edwin F. Jones. In the fall
of 195 7 they were divorced. ( R. 298)
This action is for money allegedly loaned to the
defendant, Louis C. Deluke. ( R. 14) The defendant contends that his niece, Lucy Deluke, entered into an agreement with seven other persons, including the plaintiffs,
to all of whom the defendant allegedly owed money,
whereby she agreed to assign the Carisa mining lease to
a corporation to be established, the stock of which was
to be shared in a considerable amount by the creditors
of the defendant and in return for which the creditors
agreed to discharge the defendant's obligations.
The defendant allegedly owed money totaling about
$80,000 to six persons in the Phoenix, Arizona, area and
to Edwin F. Jones, then Lucy's husband. (R. 72, 74, 162)
About December, 1956, Edwin F. Jones contacted Dr.
William Rogers, one of the persons to whom the defendant owed money, about the possibility of setting up a
corporation which would take and work the Carisa lease
held by Lucy. (R. 128)
In January or February of 1957, Dr. Rogers invited
the other five men from the Phoenix area to whom the
defendant allegedly owed money to a meeting. (R. 74,
223, 232) These men, all of whom held notes of the
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defendant, and who attend the meeting are, in addi
tion to Dr. Rogers: Mr. Paul Wermerskerchen, Dr. William A. McCarey, Dr. Frank Cocuzzi, Mr. Robert S.
Lyon (plaintiff) and Mr. Arthur P. Dansak (plaintiff).
(R. 72, 73) The purpose of the meeting of the defendant's creditors was to discuss the setting up of a corporation for the Carisa mine. ( R. 74)
Following this meeting, though the record does not
disclose the exact date, this group of creditors to whom
the defendant owed money retained Mr. Charles Stanecker, a Phoenix attorney, to represent them in the forming of this proposed corporation. ( R. 82, 128)
Mr. Stanecker actively represented the group, attending several of their meetings ( R. 82) , preparing the
papers for incorporation and handling the details (R.
129) , executing correspondence on behalf of the corporation (R. 129), and holding at least one three hour
conference with Lucy and an attorney representing her,
Mr. Troy Kennon, from Tulsa, Oklahoma. (R. 132, 133)
He prepared bylaws ( R. 96), and generally functioned
on behalf of the Phoenix group. (R. 131, 224)
According to the evidence introduced at the trial
various meetings of all or some of the persons concerned
were held during the winter following the meeting of
Dr. Rogers and Edwin F. Jones. It is not unlikely that
there be differences in the testimony as to details of
these transactions of several years past. In order, however, to present the picture of the transactions which
is most favorable to the plaintiffs-respondents' position,
the major portion of this statement of facts has been
abstracted from the testimony of the plaintiffs, and particularly Mr. Robert S. Lyon who served as secretary
3
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of the group prior to incorporation and as director and
secretary-treasurer subsequent to the incorporation.
(R. 70-130, 214, 226)
Following these negotiations in January and February of 1957, a meeting was held on March 5, 1957, in
attorney Stanecker's conference room. (R. 82) According to plaintiff Lyon attorney Stanecker attended this
meeting (R. 78, lines 5-7) though subsequently Lyon
became slightly evasive on this question. Also attending
this meeting with Mr. Stanecker were Lucy Deluke, Edwin F. Jones, and the six men from the Phoenix area
who had retained Stanecker and who held notes of the
defendant. ( R. 80)
At this meeting the name Sphinx Head Mining Corporation was selected for the proposed corporation. (R.
80) The following officers were also selected: Mr. Wermerskerchen as president, Lucy Deluke as vice-president,
and Mr. Lyon (plaintiff) as secretary-treasurer. (R. 81)
The proposed asset of the corporation was discussed at
this meeting. (R. 83)
The next evening, March 6, 195 7, another meeting
was held in attorney Stanecker's conference room. All of
the proposed incorporators, except Mr. Dansak, were
present. ( R. 83) Attorney Stanecker who was representing the Phoenix group was in attendance. (R. 83)
Though plaintiff Lyon's testimony lacks somewhat
the consistency generally desired for credibility, his admissions support the defendant's position that an agreement as to the division of shares of the corporation was
reached in the meeting of March 6. (R. 83, 97, lines 2
and 3, 100, 105) The agreement was that one million
shares were to be authorized at one dollar par value per
4
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share. Five hundred thousand shares were to go to Lucy;
two hundred thousand shares were to go to the Phoenix
group (including Edwin F. Jones) and three hundred
thousand shares were to be held for possible future public issue. (R. 83, 84, 97)
Following the action on the division of interest there
was a discussion of the conveyance of the lease to the
corporation. (R. 85) It was agreed that Lucy would convey the lease to herself and another member of the group
in trust for the purposes discussed. ( R. 85 ) Pursuant to
this agreement an assignment in trust to herself and Dr.
Rogers was executed by Lucy. (R. 87) Lyon did not
have a recollection when this trust assignment was executed. ( R. 86) Lucy testified it was prepared by attorney
Stanecker and signed by her on the evening of March
6, 1957. (R. 164)
Though a question was raised on the motion for new
trial concerning the accuracy of the thermofax exhibit,
D-5, it appears that the plaintiffs are relying upon it.
It recites in part:
WHEREAS, the said LUCY DELUKE, now
Lucy Deluke Jones, as assignee of the rights of
LOUIS C. DELUKE in said lease desires to make
a further assignment thereof in trust for the benefit of herself and others who have heretofore
loaned or advanced sums of money to LOUIS C.
DELUKE~ and~

WHEREAS, it is deemed desirable by the
undersigned and certain of the persons for whose
benefit this assignment is made~ to form a corporation to which, upon organization, the lease hereby assigned will be transferred and for which the
proposed corporation will cause to be issued shares
of stock to the persons for whose benefit this
5
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assignment is made in such amounts as shall hereafter be determined by the first constituted Board
of Directors of the proposed corporation, which
shall include the undersigned and Dr. William
J. Rogers of Phoenix, Arizona, and such others
as they shall jointly agree on and which said
proposed corporation shall be organized forthwith.
(emphasis added)
According to plaintiff Lyon, the main business of
this meeting was the discussion of the value of the Carisa
lease and the matter of the distribution of the shares of
the corporation. ( R. 86)
Articles of incorporation for the corporation were
prepared in March by attorney Stanecker and signed
by the incorporators. (R. 91 ) They were filed in the
office of the Arizona Corporation Commission on March
28, 1957. (Exhibit D-6) The incorporators consisted of
the seven men who held claims against the defendant
including the plaintiffs in this action, on the one hand,
and Lucy who had executed the assignment of the Carisa
lease in trust for the benefit of those who had loaned
money to the defendant, on the other. One million shares
of stock at par value of one dollar per share were authorized. The eight incorporators were named directors. The
following officers were named: Mr. Wermerskerchen as
president, Lucy as vice-president, and Robert S. Lyon
(plaintiff) as secretary-treasurer. (Exhibit D-6)
The first formal meeting of the Board of Directors
following the completion of the incorporation by attorney Stanecker was held in Stanecker's conference room
in Phoenix on the evening of April 16, 195 7. (R. 92)
All of the eight incorporators who now constituted the
first board of directors, except Mr. Dansak (plaintiff)
who was out of town on business, were present. ( R. 92)

6
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Dansak haJ authorized Lyon to act in his behalf at this
meeting. ( R. 92) Stanecker was present and advised the
incorporators of the completion of the incorporation.
(R. 93) He further advised that the lessor of the Carisa
lease, the Deer Trail Mining Company, had acknowledged receipt of one quarterly lease payment of $625
which he had forwarded them on behalf of the corporation. ( R. 93)
It will be recalled that Lucy had already assigned
the Carisa lease previously in trust for the purpose of
assigning it to the corporation when formed. (Exhibit
D-5) At this meeting, Lucy and Dr. Rogers who were
the trustees under the previous assignment, assigned the
lease to the corporation. (Exhibit D-7, R. 93, 94)
The Carisa lease was now an asset of the corporation. It was the only contemplated asset of the corporation and in fact the only asset ever held by the corporation. (R. 106, 115) It is clear that certain references in
the record by Lyon to money contributed to the corporation were in fact references to money advanced by
the Phoenix group to pay the costs of incorporation and
which they considered to be money loaned, not contributed as permanent capital. (R. 84 should be compared with Lyon's response to the Court's question
concerning notes at R. 104)
Stanecker read bylaws which were adopted. (R. 96)
Stanecker then proposed a voting trust for Lucy's stock.
( R. 96) Why this should be necessary to protect the interests of the Phoenix group if, as they contend, they
gave up nothing for their participation in the stock distribution of the corporation is not explained by the plaintiffs. But in any event, Lucy reluctantly agreed to attorney Stanecker's proposal. (R. 96, 97)

7
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At this point the lease had been conveyed to the
corporation. (R. 93, 94) The corporation was in existence. A proposal for a voting trust which would give
control to the Phoenix group had been approved by the
board of directors.
Then at this junction, Stanecker proposed that there
be a redivision of the shares of the corporation. (R. 97)
This proposal was not voted on at this meeting of the
16th. The meeting adjourned until the following evening.
On April 17, 1957, the incorporator-directors met
again in Stanecker's conference room. Dansak was present, but Stanecker was absent. (R. 99) In addition, Charlene Penrod, a friend of Lucy's with whom Lucy was
staying while in Phoenix attended the meeting with Lucy.
(R. 206)
At this meeting Lucy and two members of the
Phoenix group, Dr. McGarey and Dr. Rogers, were
elected trustees of the voting trust for Lucy's stock. The
trust was for ten years. ( R. 99, 100)
Following this, Edwin F. Jones moved that the stock
distribution agreement of March 6 be approved. (R.
100) Robert S. Lyon, plaintiff, secretary of the meeting, testified to this in the following words:
There was a motion by Ed Jones the agreement at the March 6th meeting, regarding distribution of stock be adopted. It was seconded by
Lucy. The President called for a question on the
motion. I, as secretary, reminded the group, on
suggestion of Attorney Stanecker, that the group
reconsider the situation, and reminded them of
the purpose behind it. ( R. 100)
This motion by Edwin F. Jones did not carry. (R.
102) Lucy and Edwin F. Jones objected to the proposed
8
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redistribution. The meeting became somewhat unruly.
( R. 207, 21 7) Lucy and Edwin F. Jones left the meeting
at this time because of the redistribution proposal and
the failure of the board to adopt the March 6 agreement.
(R. 105)
Lyon testified that later in the meeting Dansak made
a motion for redistribution. In Lyon's words:
Yes, the motion was made by Art Dansak,
the motion for redistribution of 250,000 shares
of Lucy Jones to be held for herself, and who
she represented, 100,000 for the Phoenix interest,
and 150,000 to raise capital in the event additional capital is required. (R. 102)
Although there is considerable confusion in the record because of failure accurately to consider in the discussions the correct amount of stock which would remain
unissued according to the proposed redivision, it appears,
without question, that the following redistribution was
unanimously approved by the remaining six of the eight
directors: 250,000 shares to Lucy, (this is in lieu of the
500,000 which Lyon said was the substance of the March
6 agreement) (R. 100, 102, 105), 100,000 to the Phoenix
group, and 650,000 shares to remain unissued. (R. 104,
105)
At this time, again, the Carisa lease was the only
corporate asset. ( R. 106)
Though the corporation never went through the
formality of issuing stock certificates to witness the board
of directors decision as to the distribution of stock, ( R.
124) the corporation did other acts as a corporation.
(R. 108) For example, it continued its attempts to obtain
DMEA assistance from the federal government. (R. 108)

9
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'fhe corporation was dissolved April 25, 1958. (Exhibit P-10)
Lyon insisted at trial that his participation in this
scheme by which he and the other members of the
Phoenix group, to whom it is alleged the defendant owed
$80,000, obtained the right to stock of a par value of at
least $100,000 of (and voting control over) a corporation which had as its one and only asset the lease assigned
it by the defendant's niece, had no relationship to the
fact that he and all the Phoenix group held notes of the
defendant. (R. 74, 75, 77, 107) No place in the record is
there any explanation of what other consideration might
have been used to pay for this stock set aside for the
Phoenix group, nor is there any indication that any other
mode of payment was ever considered. (R. 75, 107)
Fallowing the testimony of Lyon which provides the
basis for the major portion of the foregoing facts (R. 71
thru 129) the defendant called as a witness Mr. Troy
Kennon, a practitioner of the law of twenty years experience from Tulsa, Oklahoma. (R. 132) He testified
that in February, 1957, he was requested by the defendant to assist and represent his niece, Lucy, at a conference to be held in Phoenix, Arizona, with attorney
Stanecker of the Phoenix group. (R. 132) Lucy, Kennon
and Stanecker had a three hour conference. (R. 135)
The plaintiffs objected vigorously to the admission
of any evidence of the conference or of Kennon's advice
to Lucy following the conference. (R. 133, 134) They
objected to Kennon's offered testimony as to Stanecker's
statement of authority to speak for the Phoenix group,
(which the testimony of Lyon had unequivocably established that he represented) . The court sustained the
plaintiffs' objections and the attorney who had repre10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sented Lucy in negotiations with the attorney who admittedly represented and guided the Phoenix group's
interests was not allowed to testify concerning these negotiations. ( R. 82, 96, 224, 129) A proffer of proof to the
effect that the members of the Phoenix group were relinquishing all of their legal obligations against the defendant in return for Lucy's signing her property to the
corporation was timely made. (R. 137) The court, however, indicated that it felt the evidence still inadmissible.
(R. 137)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE PLAINTIFFS
WERE DISCHARGED BY THE CONSUMATED
AGREEMENT OF MARCH 6, 1957, WHEREBY
LUCY DELUKE ASSIGNED THE CARISA LEASE
IN TRUST FOR THE CORPORATION AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
THE PROPOSED CORPORATION AGREED UPON A STOCK DISTIBUTION, OR IN ANY EVENT,
THAT THE CLAIMS WERE DISCHARGED BY
THE SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE BY LUCY
WITH ALL TERMS OF SUCH AGREEMENT AND
THE IMPLIED RATIFICATION THEREOF BY
THE CREDITORS OF THE DEFENDANT.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE MATERIAL PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF ATTORNEY
KENNON AS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BY HIM
11
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ON BEHALF OF LUCY DELUKE WITH ATTORNEY STANECKER WHO REPRESENTED THE
PHOENIX GROUP FOR SUCH EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE AS EITHER A VERBAL ACT OR AS ADMISSIONS OF THE AUTHORIZED AGENT OF A
PRINCIPAL.
I

'

,

'

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
(FINDING NO. 11, R. 25) THAT "THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SPHINX HEAD MINING CORPORATION AGREED UPON A DIVISION OF THE
CAPITAL STOCK OF SAID CORPORATION AS
TO LUCY DELUKE AND THE PURPOSE OF ANY
PURPORTED AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO ·BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE SAID LUCY
DELUKE WAS THEREBY FRUSTRATED WITHOUT THE FAULT OR NEGLECT OF THE PLAINTIFFS," FOR THE REASON THAT THE UNCONTRADICTED ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFF LYON
IS THAT SUCH A DIVISION WAS, IN FACT,
MADE BY A VALID VOTE OF THE BOARD AT
THE APRIL 17, 1957, MEETING.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE CUMULATIVE MATERIAL PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT BY THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE
COURT.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE
THERMOFAX COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO BE THE TRUST ASSIGNMENT
FROM LUCY TO HERSELF AND DR. ROGERS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE PLAINTIFFS
WERE DISCHARGED BY THE CONSUMATED
AGREEMENT OF MARCH 6, 1957, WHEREBY
LUCY DELUKE ASSIGNED THE CARISA LEASE
IN TRUST FOR THE CORPORATION AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
THE PROPOSED CORPORATION AGREED UPON A STOCK DISTIBUTION, OR IN ANY EVENT,
THAT THE CLAIMS WERE DISCHARGED BY
THE SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE BY LUCY
WITH ALL THE TERMS OF SUCH' AGREEMENT
AND THE IMPLIED RATIFICATION THEREOF
BY THE CREDITORS OF THE DEFENDANT.
The uncontroverted evidence in this case can support but one conclusion. This evidence, mostly in the
testimony of plaintiff Lyon shows that the six men from
the Phoenix area who allegedly held notes against the
defendant jointly retained an attorney, Mr. Stanecker,
and set out on a concerted course of action to obtain the
Carisa lease as the sole asset of a corporation to be formed
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for that purpose and in which corporation they would
participate as shareholders and ultimately as the controlling interest in the corporation.
The alleged obligations owed by the defendant to
these six men (and including the obligation claimed by
Edwin F. Jones) amounted to approximately $80,000.
(R. 162) The testimony of Lucy and Mr. Jones clearly
fills in the obvious memory lapses of the plaintiffs and
indicates without question that the original agreement
was to provide stock in the proposed corporation to the
Phoenix group on a basis of two shares of stock for each
dollar of claimed indebtedness of the defendant. ( R. 162,
24 7) At no time was there any discussion or plan on
the part of the Phoenix group to provide any contributed
permanent capital to the corporation. The Carisa lease
was the only asset contemplated for the corporation. It
was the only asset held by the corporation. It was in fact
transferred in trust for the benefit of those who held
claims against the defendant as a result of the agreement
reached March 6, 195 7. ( R. 86, 164) Examination of
this trust agreement and the subsequent conveyance to
the corporation, both drawn by attorney Stanecker, reveal, though it was perhaps not obviously intended to
do so, that the conveyances were for the benefit of the
defendant's creditors.
Whether it be assumed that the Phoenix group were
to receive the higher figure agreed upon on March 6
by the members of the proposed board of directors of
200,000 shares of stock or the lower figure of 100,000
shares of stock which the board of directors arrived at,
at the suggestion of attorney Stanecker, as a redistribution of the stock on April 17, 195 7, is immaterial to the
question of what consideration the Phoenix group gave
14
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for such stock. This could only have been their claims
against the defendant.
Article 14, section 6, of the Arizona Constitution
provides that stock shall only be issued to bona fide
subscribers. The Phoenix group had retained attorney
Stanecker to represent them. Unless their purpose was
wholly larcenous, it defies logical experience to assume
that under these circumstances the Phoenix group considered that the agreed distribution of stock to them
was a gift on the part of the niece of the man against
whom they held claims. Under Arizona law somebody
had to pay for the stock to be distributed to them.
Lucy did everything required of her under any interpretation of the agreement. There was no requirement
that she cooperate willingly and meekly to a fleecing by
the Phoenix group.
Plaintiffs Lyon and Dansak insisted at trial that
their knowing participation in this concerted action by
the Phoenix group was not in any way related to or concerned with the fact that seven out of eight of the incorporators held claims against the uncle of the only other
incorporator, the incorporator who provided the only
asset to the corporation. They had the advice of an attorney undoubtedly familiar with Arizona law. It stretches
the bonds of credibility beyond the breaking point to
accept their contention that under these circumstances
it was not intended, expressly or impliedly, by all concerned that the transaction to which Lucy agreed, and
which was consumated completely by Lucy, did not include relinquishment of their claims against the defendant.
The self-serving statements at trial by the plaintiffs
can have no bearing upon the obvious fact that objec15
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tively a contract Was made, at least ·by the March 6 meeting and completely complied with by Lucy and ratified
by the subsequent acts of the incorporators.
The Phoenix group had early sought the advice of
counsel·- Mr. Stanecker. The subject matterwas a lease
of partially developed mining property on which had
been expended thousands· of· dollars of work and money,
adjacent to Deer Trail Mines. (R. 140, 260) The proposed corporation was to be, and was, incorporated with
one million authorized shares of one dollar par value
stock. Negotiations covered a period of. several months.
Thus h is the defendant's position that the March
6, 1957, meeting resulted in an accord and satisfaction
wherein the Phoenix group traded their claims against
the defendant in return for a promised share. in the. proposed corporation. It was at this time that. Lucy committed the lease for this ,purpose by conveying it in trust.
This· position' by the defendant iS not inconsiste~t with
the further contention that should it be legally held that
there was not such a result flowing from the March 6
meeting, that such a result did, nevertheless, obtain from
the cmitinuati.on of the transactions which saw the establishment of the corporation, the conveyance of the lease
to it, and a redistribution. of the stock by the board of
direc~trs o~ April 17, 1957.
.
· The testimony of Lyon and Dansak is clear and,
where credible, conclusive~ The documents speak· for
themselves.
The plaintiffs are in no position to complain that
after they received what they had bargained. for, their
apparent greed and overreaching in trying to obtain absolute and complete control of the entire authorized issued
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stock (which they did by their voting trust arrangement)
resulted in Lucy's displeasure and their subsequent abandonment of their selfish plan.
The only tenable conclusion which can be reached
on the basis of the uncontradicted evidence is that objectively a· contract was formed whereby Lucy promised
to convey the Carisa lease in trust for a future corporation in reurn for a promise on the part of the Phoenix
group to discharge and release the obligations they claimed against Lucy's unde, Louis C. Deluke. What the
Phoenix group may have subjectively felt or intended is
wholly immaterial. ·

'POINT II.
I

THE TRIAL COURT. ERRED TO THE MATERIAL PREJUDICE. OF. THE DEFENDANT IN. EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF ATTORNEY
KENNON AS TO NEGOTIATIONS BY HIM ON
BEHALF OF LUCY DELUKE WITa ATTORNEY
STANECKER WHO REPRESENTED THE PHOENIX GROUP FOR SUCH EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE AS EITHER A VERBAL ACT OR AS ADMISSIONS OF THE AUTHORIZED A9ENT OF. A
PRINCIPAL.
The plaintiff offer~d no credible evidence as to the
nature of the negotiations, their purpose or their terms,
but relied upon excluding ess-ential eviden~e in an attempt to frustrate the defendant's case.
On the· one hand, Lucy· and the defendant's witnesses testified to an agreement and to the compliance
with the terms of the agreement by Lucy. On the other
hand, the plaintiffs testified squarely to no such agreement, though their testimony is patently untrustworthy
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in view of the admitted facts. Though it is the defendant's contention that the admitted facts require the reversal of the judgment for the plaintiff, it is incontestable that at the trial stage any evidence a person of the
stature of an attorney of twenty years experience, a member of a bar of a sister state, could provide as to the
very crux of the issue - the fulcrum of the case - should
have been admitted if admissible under any of the many
rules of evidence. It cannot be said that such evidence,
had it been admitted, could not have caused a different
result, and accordingly, to have excluded it is prejudicial
error if it could have been admitted on any basis.
Plaintiffs objected to the admission of this crucial
evidence by a witness who credibility they would have
found hard to attack, on two grounds: ( 1 ) That agency
cannot be proved by the admissions of the agent, and
( 2) that the hearsay rule excluded evidence of the negotiations and the subsequent advice given Lucy following
the negotiations.
It is the defendant's position that the Court erred
as to its interpretation of the facts before it and as to
the law applicable to those facts in sustaining the plaintiff's objection.
There had already been admitted uncontradicted
admissions by plaintiff Lyon as to the nature of the joint
action by the Phoenix group and as to the fact of agency
by Stanecker and the scope of that agency. Shortly after
the first meeting of the creditors of the defendant Stanecker was retained to assist them in carrying out their
purpose. ( R. 82, 128, 131 ) Plaintiff Lyon testified:
"After Ed Jones had made contact with Dr. Rogers in
respect to the Carisa lease, Dr. Rogers subsequently
called a meeting of the people in the Phoenix area seek18
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ing their advice and assistance in forming a corporation,
and in order to do so we needed an attorney." (R. 128)
Lyon later testified, "We had employed the attorney
we felt he was acting for our best interest." (R. 224) In
addition to the express admissions of the plaintiffs, the
facts speak eloquently for themselves. Stanecker attended
various meetings of the Phoenix group, including the
March 5th meeting ( R. 78) ; he advised Lyon and the
other incorporators (R. 82) ; he had negotiations with
Lucy, including the three hour session with her and
attorney Kennon ( R. 135) . Stanecker undertook and
completed the incorporation of the corporation on behalf
of the Phoenix group. ( R. 93) He prepared bylaws.
( R. 96) He prepared the documents used for assigning
the lease. (R. 129, 131) He executed correspondence on
behalf of the corporation ( R. 129) and paid, on behalf
of the corporation, one of the lease rental payments.
(R. 93) He was present at the April 16 meeting, representing the Phoenix group, and at that time he proposed
the voting trust for Lucy's stock and the redivision of the
shares of the corporation. (R. 96, 97)
Consideration of the nature of the transaction for
which Stanecker was retained clearly emphasizes the fact
and extent of his agency. Stanecker, an attorney in Phoenix, was retained by the Phoenix creditors of the defendant to represent them in a transaction which called
for the setting up of a million dollar corporation under
Arizona law, the obtaining of a lease to mining property as the sole asset of that corporation and the distribution of the stock of that corporation to various persons,
including the Phoenix creditors of the defendant.
One can simply ask if under these circumstances
there is anything more pivotal or crucial, more within
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the scope of an attorney's agency in setting up a corporation of this type than the relationship between the
contributed permanent asset of the corporation and the
consideration for which stock representing that asset is
to be issued to other than the contributor of the asset.
Under these facts, the self-serving declarations at
trial by the plaintiffs that they did not intend, nor authorize, Stanecker to represent them in this aspect of
the matter are not only suspect, but wholly immaterial
for it is clear that such matters were within the scope
of the agent's actual and apparent authority.
Restatement of Agency 2d, §50 provides
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to make a
contract is inferred from authority ·to conduct a
transaction, if the making of such a contract is in. cidental to the transaction, usually accompanies
such a transaction, or is reasonably necessary .to
accomplish it.
And secret instructions to the contrary will not have
a limiting effect on apparent authority. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Porter, 186 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir.
1950); 1 Mechem, Agency, §710 (2d ed. 1914).
The relationship between Stanecker and the Phoenix
group was that of agent and principal. It was in no
manner related to litigation or pending or contemplated
litigation. As stated in Brown v. Hebb, 176 Md. 535,
175 A. 602, 97 A.L.R. 366 ( 1934) at page 607,
So far as any general conclusions may be deduced . . . it is that an attorney employed without reference to pending litigation is but an agent
and that his authority to bind pis principal by
his admissions is not affected by the fact that
he is an attorney at law except in so far as that
20
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fact may reflect upon the apparent scope of the
agency.
It is the defendant's position that negotiations between Stanecker and Kennon were admissible as verbal
acts, that the Phoenix group, including plaintiffs, had
clothed Stanecker with actual, and also apparent, authority to represent them, and that. the negotiations between Stanecker on the one hand and Kennon and Lucy
on the other are admissilbe as part and parcel of the
dealings under scrutiny at trial.
Hawkins v. Parry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372
(1953);
McDonald v. McDonald, 143 S.W. 2d 142 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940);

6 Wigmore, Evidence, §1770 (3d. ed. 1940).
In addition to being admissible as verbal acts, frequentely called part of the "res gestae,'; Kennon's testimony should have been admitted as the admissions of
an agent in the scope of his discharge of his duties for
his principal.
While it may be that the fact of agency cannot be
proved solely by the admissions of an agent, it is equally
clear that once the fact of agency is prima facie established, the acts and admissions of the agent are admissible against the principal as in other cases.
Jameson v. First Savings Bank and Trust Co., 40
N.M. 133, 55 P.2d 743, 103 A.L.R. 1492
(1936);
Buchanan v. Wilson, 159 Va. 49, 165 S.E. 422
(1932);
Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist., 46 Cal.App.2d
477, 116 P.2d 121 (1941);
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Lowe v. Huckins, 356 Ill. 360, 190 N.E. 683
( 1934) ;
1 Mechem, Agency, §299 (2d ed. 1914);
4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1078 (3d ed. 1940) ;
20 Am. ]ur., Evidence, §589;
31 C.].S., Evidence, §344.
And this prima facie proof of the fact of agency
may be established by circumstantial evidence.
Jameson v. First Savings Bank and Trust Co., 40
N.W. 133, 55 P.2d 743, 103 A.L.R. 1492
(1936);
Brown v. Hebb, 167 Md. 535, 175 A. 602, 97
A.L.R. 366 ( 1934) ;
Glover v. Sommerour, 165 Ga. 513, 141 S.E. 211
(1928);
Lowe v. Huckins, 356 Ill. 360, 190 N.E. 683
(1934);
20 Am. fur., Evidence, §597;
31 C.].S., Evidence, §344.
After the prima facie case is shown, the agent's
admissions as to his authority may be shown.
jameson v. First Savings Bank and Trust Co., 40
N.M. 133, 55 P.2d 743, 103 A.L.R. 1492
(1936);
Carter v. Carr, 139 Cal.App. 15, 33 P.2d 852
(1934);
Under the evidence before the court, and the law
applicable, there is no doubt that Stanecker was acting
within the scope of his authority in dealing with Lucy
and Kennon.
Professor McCormick, speaking of admissions of
attorney-agents retained not in reference to litigation,
says
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The older cases manifest a natural if unconscious tendency to protect the client against the
hazard of evidence of statements by his attorney
more strictly than in respect to statements by
other types of agents. The later cases, properly it
seems, measure the authority of the attorney to
make out-of-court admissions by the same tests
of express or implied authority as would be applied to other agents, and when they meet these
tests admit as evidentiary admissions the statements of attorneys in letters or oral conversations
made in the course of efforts for the collection
or resistance of claims, or negotiations for the
settlement of suits or controversies, or the management of any other business in behalf of the client.
McCormick, Evidence, §244, p. 520 ( 1954).
Recent cases support the proposition that a principal does not obtain judicial immunity from disclosure
of the admissions of his attorney-agent in non-litigation
matters. In Visgilio v. Schoof, 82 R.I. 4, 105 A.2d 470
( 1954) a letter written by an attorney for the defendant
in a collection negotiation was admitted to show that
the letter contained an admission against the client. In
McGarity v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 Pa. 308, 59
A.2d 47 (1948) the court allowed the admission of a
statement of counsel for an executor as a ground for
rejecting a claim against the deceased. Lickteig v. Buckholz, 129 Conn. 399, 28 A.2d 871 (1942) held that an
attorney retained to collect a claim was impliedly authorized to state to the debtor what the claim was. In Gibson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 S.W.2d 193
(Mo.App. 1941) a letter of an attorney was admitted on
the theory that it was an admission that no basis other
than that in the letter existed for a claim. In Suntken v.
Suntken, 223 Iowa 347, 272 N.W. 132 (1937) the court
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admitted an admission of fact in an attorney's letter
writen in the course of negotiations for compromise.
Similarity between the instant case and Carter v.
139 Cal.App. 15, 33 P.2d 852 ( 1934) as to the
principals' in-court denial of agency, makes the court's
language in that case significant. At page 857 the court
said
It has been decided, for example, that, when
it has been shown that a person was given actual
or ostensible authority to act for another in a
particular matter, any declaration made by the
agent at the time of the transaction of the business intrusted or apparently intrusted to him, and
relating to such business, is admissible as part of
the res gestae.
Carr~

In Carter the proof of agency was considerably less
substantial and as firmly denied as in the instant case.
The admissions of the agent were held admissible concerning a transaction for the sale of dairy cows.
Just as there is no question but that the admissions
of an agent within the scope of his authority and while
in the discharge of the duties intrusted or apparently
intrusted to him are admissible against the principal

Nuttall v. Holman~ 110 Utah 375, 173 P.2d 1015
(1946);
4 Wigmore, Evidence~ §1078, p. 119 (3d ed.
1940);
McCormick, Evidence~ § 244, p. 517 ( 1954) ;
so is there no question but that when men undertake
joint action such as was done here by the Phoenix group
to accomplish a common end and retain an agent to represent them in that venture that the admissions of one
of them rna y be admissible against the others and that
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the admissions of the agent may be admissible against
all of them.
McCutchan v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. of Kansas
City, Mo., 122 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.App. 1938);
Lowe v. Huckins, 356 Ill. 360, 190 N.E. 683
( 1934).

Even had the trial court felt that there was insufficient evidence of agency before it, it was error considering the admissions of plaintiff Lyon, to exclude the testimony of Kennon. The trial court has wide discretion to
admit such evidence subject to later rejection.
McCormick, Evidence, §60, p. 138 (1954).
If the evidence of Kennon as to these negotiations
with the attorney for the Phoenix group was admissible
on any ground, it was error to exclude it,
McCormick, Evidence, §59, p. 135 ( 1954)
and since it was offered by a member of the legal profession with twenty years experience and related to the
most important question in issue, and offered the court
an opportunity to hear evidence in which confidence
could be placed on material assertions of fact which the
plainitffs' deny it was prejudicial error to exclude it for
it cannot be said that had the court heard it he could
not have reached a decision other than the one he
reached.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
(FINDING NO. 11, R. 25) THAT "THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS OF SPHINX HEAD MINING
25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CORPORATION AGREED UPON A DIVISION OF
THE CAPITAL STOCK OF SAID CORPORATION
AS TO LUCY DELUKE AND THE PURPOSE OF
ANY PURPORTED AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE SAID
LUCY DELUKE WAS THEREBY FRUSTRATED
WITHOUT THE FAULT OR NEGLECT OF THE
PLAINTIFFS," FOR THE REASON THAT THE
UNCONTRADICTED ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFF
LYON IS THAT SUCH A DIVISION WAS, IN
FACT, MADE BY A VALID VOTE OF THE BOARD
AT THE APRIL 17, 1957, MEETING.
The only inference which can be drawn from Finding No. 11 is that had the court believed that a division
was made by the board of directors it would have been
compelled to find for the defendant, or at least it would
not have felt precluded from finding for the defendant.
The division of which the court had reference probably refers to the language in Exhibit D-5, set forth
earlier in this brief. It is the defendant' position that
this agreement was consumated on March 6 by the division adopted at that time and by the assignment in
trust of the lease. If this not be the case, the defendant
respectfully submits that the court erred, nonetheless,
for there was a valid division of stock agreed to at a
meeting of the board of directors on April 17, 195 7.
Plaintiff Lyon's admission at trial that on the evening of April 17, 195 7, at a meeting of the board of directors of the then incorporated corporation, that the
board duly approved a motion for division of stock by a
unanimous vote of a valid quorum, stands uncontradicted
throughout the record. (R. 102, 122)
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All members of the first constituted board of directors were present at the commencement of the meeting.
At the time of the vote six of the eight members remained and all six voted for the motion of redistribution of stock. This was valid action by the board.
2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, §411, 419,
425 (1954)
Since no one denies that this action took place, the
uncontradicted admission of the plaintiff is binding upon
him. The defendant contends that the March 6 agreement as to division of stock consumated Lucy's agreement with the Phoenix group and discharged the defendant's obligations to the plaintiffs. However, if this
court determines this not be the case, it is submitted that
this valid action of the board of directors of the corporation on April 17, did consumate and ratify the prior
transaction and thereby discharged the obligations of
the defendant to the plaintiffs.
Since the court's finding in this regard is clearly
contrary to the uncontested admission of the plaintiff
Lyon, it cannot stand. On this basis also, the judgment
should be reversed.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE CUMULATIVE MATERIAL PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT BY THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE
COURT.
The defendant submits that errors already noted are
sufficient to require reversal. The defendant desires
to point out several additional errors in the exclusion of

27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence, the cumulative effect of which could only materially prejudice the defendant's case.
The discussion in Point II concerning the admission of the statements of an agent and the agency between those engaged in a joint undertaking is incorporated herein by reference.
The errors of which the defendant complains are:
The sustaining of the plaintiff's objection to the
guesti?n·, ~s to what the agreement was concerning stock
distribution at the time Lucy signed the trust assignment. (R. 97) As secretary of the meeting, plaintiff
Lyon was in a position to know if the proposed distribution of stock had been agreed to and as to the terms
of the agreement.
·
The sustaining of plaintiffs' objection as to the agreement between Lucy and Dr. Rogers concerning his claims
against the defendant. ( R. 145) While it may be that
similar transactions are generally immaterial, this is not
the case here for the creditors of the defendant were
jointly endeavoring to accomplish a given end. What one
of them did was the business of the others, and legally
was admissible to show what the group was doing and
had a bearing on the objective formation of a contract
between the Lucy and the Phoenix group. In this case
none of the objections made by plaintiff are pertinent.
Each participant was the agent of the others. An adequate foundation had been established. It was not necessary that either of the plaintiffs be present at the transaction in order for the statements to be admissible. Authorities in Point II are applicable here.
The sustaining of the objection to the admission
of the letter from Lucy to Stanecker. (R. 152) This let28
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ter should have been admitted as part of the transaction
involved. Lucy's understanding of the transaction goes
to the question of whether there was a meeting of the
minds on the agreement and to the question of what the
agreement was.
The sustaining of the plaintiffs' objection to the
question whether Stanecker said he was speaking for
the Phoenix group. ( R. 156) As discussed in Point II,
an adequate showing of agency had been made and the
exclusion of the agent's statements as to his authority
were, in this instance, error.
The sustaining of plaintiffs' objections and the striking of testimony of Edwin F. Jones to the effect that
the creditors of the defendant intended to relinquish their
claims against the defendant in return for their participation in the corporation to be formed. ( R. 234, 235)
The cumulative effect of these errors was to deny
the trial court evidence on the critical issues of the case.
It is submitted that this is reversable error.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL TO
DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE THERMOFAX COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PURPORTING
TO BE THE TRUST ASSIGNMENT FROM LUCY
TO HERSELF AND DR. ROGERS.
It appears that sometime between the taking of
depositions of Lucy and the defendant and the time of
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trial, the original of the trust assignment which was introduced at the taking of the deposition was lost or mislaid. In its place there was introduced at trial a thermofax document purporting to be a copy of the missing
trust agreement.
Affidavits submitted in conjunction with the motion for new trial, and part of the record here, raise
a question as to the accuracy and possibly the authenticity of this thermofax copy. It is the defendant's position
that the trial court erred in not taking evidence on this
matter since it is material to the issues before the court.

CONCLUSION
The defendant submits that the evidence does not
support a judgment for the plaintiffs. Exercise of this
court's prerogative and responsibility to review the record and the evidence before the trial court will substantiate the defendant's position that the consumated agreement of March 6, 195 7, discharged the notes and obligations on which the plaintiffs now sue, and in any event
that the assignment of the lease to the corporation and
the division of stock by the board of directors on April
17, 195 7, discharged the notes and obligations on which
the plaintiffs now sue.
The defendant submits that the remaining points
in the defendant's brief indicate wherein the trial court
materially erred to the substantial prejudice of the defendant's right to a full and fair hearing of all material
evidence on the controlling issues.
The defendant prays that this court reverse the judgment of the lower court and order judgment entered
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for the defendant, or if such reversal not be granted, that
a new trial be ordered with instructions consonant with
the law in order that the rights of the parties may be
protected by a full and accurate disclosure of the transactions involved.
Respectfully submitted,

GARDNER AND BURNS
By J. HARLAN BURNS
Attorneys for the Appellant.

ROBERT L. SCHMID
Of Counsel
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